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Open source (OS) licenses differ in the conditions under which licensors and OS contributors are 
allowed to modify and redistribute the source code. While recent research has explored the 
determinants of license choice, we know little about the impact of license choice on project success. 
In this paper, we measure success by the speed with which programming bugs are fixed. Using data 
obtained from SourceForge.net, a free service that hosts OS projects, we test whether the license 
chosen by project leaders influences bug resolution rates. In initial regressions, we find a strong 
correlation between the hazard of bug resolution and the use of highly restrictive licenses. However, 
license choices are likely to be endogenous. We instrument license choice using (i) the human 
language in which contributors operate and (ii) the license choice of the project leaders for a previous 
project. We then find weak evidence that restrictive licenses adversely affect project success.  
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1. Introduction 
The source code of open source (OS) software programs is made available for 
everybody to use, modify, or redistribute free of charge, but under certain conditions. 
Usually, the contributors to OS projects are not paid for their work and are free to make 
contributions to the area that might interest them. Nevertheless, certain OS products have 
become predominant in their category (e.g. the Apache web server or the Linux Operating 
System) and large corporations (like IBM, Sun, or HP) have launched major projects to 
develop OS products. The OS phenomenon seems to contradict basic economic principles, 
creating puzzles for economic analysis: Why do developers around the world make voluntary 
and unpaid contribution to the provision of a public good? What makes OS programs thrive 
in a world dominated by proprietary standards? 
A recent surge in interest in the economics of OS has attempted to shed light on a 
number of issues. Some authors explore the contributors’ incentives to write OS code 
[Ghosh et al (2002), Lerner and Tirole (2002, 2004)] or the identity of the contributors 
[Mockus et al (2002), Von Krogh et al (2003), Lakhani and von Hippel (2000)]. Others 
analyze the need of restrictive licenses [Dahlander and Magnusson (2005), Lerner and Tirole 
(2002b), Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2003)] or the quality of OS relative to proprietary software 
[Kuan (2001), Bessen (2002)]. One important question is what makes some OS projects 
thrive, while others are abandoned from the start. What affects the chances of a project 
becoming successful? Most OS projects are initiated by one or more individuals, the leaders 
of the project, who write a piece of code and release it under some OS license hoping it will 
attract other contributions that will build on the initial code. This initial mass of code is 
critical for the future success of the project. Its quality, the promise of exciting challenging 
programming problems, and the demand for the application are all factors that affect its 
appeal to potential contributors. The reputation of the leader is important in attracting new 
contributions as well. A credible leader will make the initial code more appealing to the 
programming community. An unknown leader can compensate and attract contributors by 
writing quality code and identifying challenging tasks that will need to be solved in the future 
[Lerner and Tirole (2002)].  
Besides all of the above, the OS license choice could be one of the factors that affect 
the success of the project, as programmers seem to care critically about it. Indeed, when 
licenses terms are altered, there is considerable controversy. In 2002, Wine (a program loader 
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capable of running on Linux and other POSIX compatible operating systems applications 
originally written for Windows) switched from an unrestricted license according to which 
modified source code does not have to be made freely available as long as the original source 
is acknowledged, to one that requires that. Wine’s alteration to the licensing terms created 
considerable furor among contributors.   
In this paper, we explore whether certain types of licenses attract new contributions 
and foster the innovation process more readily than others. We analyze whether employing a 
specific OS license affects the success of the project, if certain types of licenses make 
projects more likely to thrive, receive ongoing contributions, and have a greater life span 
than others.  
Although the source code of an OS program is publicly available, the OS innovation 
method rests on property rights. Projects are initiated under OS licenses that differ in the 
conditions under which licensors and contributors are allowed to modify and redistribute the 
source code. On one hand, restrictive “copy-left” licenses like the Netscape’s Mozilla Public 
License require that the modified code be made available for free use, modification, and 
redistribution. Unrestrictive licenses, like the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) license 
do not impose this restriction. On the other hand, project leaders have the choice to employ 
highly restrictive licenses, like the “viral” GNU General Public License (GPL), that requires 
any piece of modified code be released under the same license. Less restrictive licenses like 
the Lesser GPL (LGPL) require that the altered code be made generally available, but not 
necessarily under the same license. It is not obvious whether the OS method of innovation 
needs licenses and what restrictions are necessary when licenses are needed [Maurer, 
Scotchmer (2006)]. The existing empirical literature focuses on the determinants of OS 
license choice at firm or project level [Lerner and Tirole (2005), Koski (2005), Bonaccorsi 
and Rossi (2003)]. Nevertheless, none of the previous studies analyzes whether the license 
adopted affects the outcome, the success and quality of the OS project. Our paper explores 
whether the initial license choice decision made by the leaders influences project success.   
The question of what motivates software programmers to contribute to OS 
programs has been a major one. Theory suggests a number of incentives that drive 
developers to participate in OS projects. They might work to fix a bug or customize a 
program for their own benefit; they might want to signal talent to their peers or potential 
future employers when solving a challenging problem; or they might want to improve their 
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programming skills or simply enjoy working on a challenging programming task [Lerner and 
Tirole (2002), Lerner and Tirole (2004)].  
Because of these various motivations, the relationship between license type and 
developer contributions is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, licenses that are more 
restrictive might encourage OS developers to contribute. Highly restrictive licenses like the 
GPL do not allow the bundling of the open source code with proprietary code. In contrast, 
less restrictive licenses do not prevent commercial software firms from “hijacking” OS code, 
mixing it with proprietary code and selling the resulting product. When hijacking occurs, OS 
contributors are inevitably deprived of some of the benefits they had expected from writing 
code, benefits that had motivated them to make their contribution in the first place (Lerner 
and Tirole, 2005). OS contributors might have to pay for the final product, they might be 
unable to modify it for their own use, and their contributions might not be visible in the final 
product sold by the commercial firm. The career prospects and talent-signaling incentive is 
stronger the more visible and informative about talent is the performance of the 
programmer [Holmstrom (1999)]. Moreover, the OS community might lose interest in the 
project when a commercial variant is sold, making the initial OS contributions less visible.  
However, there are also reasons why less restrictive licenses might attract greater 
involvement. First, some OS developers may have their own use of the code in mind and 
less restrictive licenses give them greater freedom to develop as they see fit their own 
projects that incorporate the OS code. In particular, they may be attracted to working on 
problems with unrestrictive licenses by the prospect of commercializing their own 
adaptation of the code. Second, developers may believe that many OS projects will be of 
little value unless they are supplemented with complementary proprietary code, and 
restrictive licenses may therefore diminish their chance of success [Lerner and Tirole (2005)]. 
Measuring the success of a software project is a difficult task. One aspect of success 
is the eventual quality of the software, but there are numerous dimension of quality including 
flexibility, robustness, ease-of-use, and speed. Kuan (2002) proposes measuring the bug 
resolution rate (the period of time in which bugs are fixed) as a proxy for the rate of quality 
improvement. She argues that the list of bugs itself would not be a good quality proxy, as a 
long list might only suggest bugs are discovered more frequently, and discovery might be 
driven in large part by the perceived quality of an application. We follow Kuan (2002) and 
employ the bug resolution time as a proxy for quality improvement.  
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We use the SourceForge.net, a free service that hosts about 100,000 open source 
projects initiated since 1999, to construct a dataset consisting of over 300 projects and more 
than 1,700 bugs. We estimate non-parametric Kaplan Meier survival curves and Cox 
proportional hazard models to show, as hypothesized, that projects with highly restrictive 
licenses attract enough effort to have their bugs fixed more rapidly: the hazard of bug 
resolution for projects that employ highly restrictive licenses is 30 percent to 50 percent 
greater than for projects that employ less restrictive licenses. This positive correlation 
between the bug resolution rate and the restrictiveness of the license is robust to the 
inclusion of numerous controls. 
Despite the long list of controls we employ in the Cox hazard regressions, we ought 
nevertheless be concerned that unobserved technical characteristics of the OS project might 
indicate to the project leaders that bugs will be unusually hard and time-consuming to solve 
and induce them to choose a particular type of OS license. For example, if a project leader 
knows that a programming problem is particularly challenging, he or she may prefer a 
restrictive license that prevents commercial competitors from hijacking the code; for simple 
problems, the project leader knows that commercial competitors could easily solve the 
problem on their own and therefore will be less concerned with potential hijacking.  
To address the potential endogeneity problem, we use two distinct instruments for 
license type. First, we use the human language in which programmers operate. Second, we 
use (on a reduced sample size), the project leader’s previous project license type. The first 
instrument is relatively weak, but we have a high degree of confidence in its validity. The 
second instrument is much stronger, but we are less confident of its validity: if a project 
leader repeatedly initiates projects of a similar type and these projects involve unobserved 
characteristics, then the instrument will be correlated with the disturbance term in the same 
direction as the endogenous regressor. Nonetheless, in both cases, there is a fundamental 
change in our results. The positive correlation between the bug resolution rate and the 
restrictiveness of the license is eliminated. Using human language, we find that restrictive 
licenses reduce the bug resolution rate. Using the previous license type chosen by the project 
leader, we find no effect of license type on the resolution rate. If the second instrument is 
invalid, we can anticipate that the coefficient on license type is biased toward the 
inconsistent coefficient obtained without instrumenting. Taking these results as a whole, we 
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conclude there is weak, but hardly convincing, evidence that restrictive licenses reduce bug 
resolution rates. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief history of the 
OS licenses. Section 3 describes our dataset. Section 4 presents our estimation results. 
Section 5 discusses instrumental variable estimation. Section 6 concludes.  
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2. A Brief History of Open Source Licensing 
  In the 1960s and 1970s, mainframe software was freely shared among users, it came 
with the source code and it could be modified and improved. At the time, the selling of the 
hardware was seen as the revenue generator and higher quality software encouraged people 
to buy more hardware. In 1969, the U.S. Department of Justice filed an antitrust suit against 
IBM. IBM was accused of taking advantage of its strong market position in hardware. The 
company responded by unbundling its software. This was the beginning of the modern 
commercial software industry. In the 1980s, AT&T started to enforce intellectual property 
rights related to the UNIX operating system, to which numerous academic and corporate 
researchers contributed. In response to the litigation treats over UNIX, in 1984, MIT 
researcher Richard Stallman founded the Free Software Foundation that developed and 
distributed software under a formal open source license called the General Public License 
(GPL). It is also called a “copy-left” license because it seeks to prevent software developed 
cooperatively from becoming proprietary. Software under the GPL is free to use, modify, or 
redistribute, but it requires that any modified versions or parts of the copy-left code be made 
freely available under the GPL. Moreover, even GPL source code mixed with code 
developed under other licenses has to be licensed under the same GPL conditions. This is 
called the “viral” provision of the GPL. 
 In the 1980s, the GPL was the most widely used open source license.  In the 1990s 
this changed as Debian, an organization founded to disseminate an early Linux operating 
system, faced the problem of defining the licenses of different building parts of the Debian 
GNU/Linux operating system. To address this issue, the leader of the Debian developed in 
1995 the “Debian Social Contract”, which allowed the bundling of open source and 
proprietary software.  
In 1998, a number of open source developers adopted this licensing arrangement, 
which became known as the “Open Source Definition”.  The licenses that fall under the 
Open Source Definition include copy-left licenses (like Netscape’s Mozilla Public License) 
that are not “viral” (like the GPL), meaning they do not require that the modified source 
code fall under the same license as the original code. Nevertheless, they require that the 
modified code be made available for free use, modification, and redistribution. 
 Larry Wall, the founder of Perl, a UNIX based programming language, initially 
released it under the GPL, later decided the license is too restrictive and developed the 
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Artistic License, a non-copyleft license that allows users to mix proprietary and open source 
code and does not place restrictions on the modified source code. Non-copy-left licenses 
such as the Berkeley Software Distribution or the Apache licenses allow a lot of flexibility to 
contributors, as well. They allow the free use, redistribution, and modification of the 
software and the modified source code does not have to be made freely available as long as 
the original source is acknowledged. In the recent years, the less restrictive licenses have 
become more and more popular, as numerous developers believe that the bundling of open 
source with proprietary code in areas poorly served by the open source community will 
improve the success of the open source movement.  
We follow Lerner, Tirole (2005) and define three types of OS licenses: unrestrictive, 
restrictive, and highly restrictive. Highly restrictive licenses (like the GPL) are those that 
contain the “viral” provision that requires that modified versions of the code be made 
available under the same license as the original code. Restrictive licenses (e.g. Mozilla Public 
License), also called “copy-left” licenses, require that altered code be made generally 
available, but not necessarily under the same license. Table 1 summarizes the OS licenses 
under which the projects in our sample operate. Some projects operate under two licenses as 
parts of the source code fall under different licenses, or the contributor may be able to 
decide what license he prefers for his contribution. Our sample contains 121 bugs from 15 
such projects.  
 
Table 1. Types of Open Source Licenses in Our Sample 
 Restrictive Highly Restrictive Number of observations 
Apache Software License No No 23 
Artistic License No No 11 
BSD License No No 79 
Eiffel Forum License Yes No 2 
General Public License Yes Yes 1002 
Lesser GPL Yes No 220 
MIT License No No 40 
Mozilla Public License 1.1 Yes No 172 
Nethack Public License Yes No 10 
Qt Public License Yes No 26 
Zlib/libpng License No No 10 
Proprietary License Yes Yes 39 
Public Domain No No 8 
Other ? ? 69 
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3. Dataset Construction 
 To construct our dataset, we use the SourceForge.net, a free service that hosts about 
100,000 open source projects since 1999. First, we chose all the projects registered on 
SourceForge during the month of January 2003. There were 932 such projects. For each 
project, we sorted the list of bugs in alphabetical order by the summary of the bug written by 
the contributor who posted it, in descending order. We then took the first 10 bugs, in case 
there were more than 10, and all the bugs listed otherwise. A great number of the projects 
had no activity at all. For each bug, we extracted from SourceForge the following details: bug 
ID, summary, date submitted, bug status (open, closed, pending, or deleted), date closed 
(whenever the status was closed), and priority. To each bug, we attached the following 
information about the project: project ID, project name, registration date, development 
status, license under which the project operates, operating system, audience, programming 
language, number of contributors, topic, human languages in which the programmers 
operate, and database environment. We had no pending bugs (the pending status is used 
when additional information is needed in order to resolve the issue), but we deleted the 
observations that consisted of deleted bugs because we are analyzing the bug resolution rates 
and the deleted bugs are typically bugs that were cancelled by the project team before getting 
solved. The final sample includes 317 projects with 1711 bugs. Table 2 summarizes the 
percentage of observations along characteristics of the projects. Most of the bugs in our 
sample come from projects oriented towards end-users and developers, geared to the 
POSIX family of operating systems or Microsoft Windows. Also, the sample is dominated 
by bugs coming from software development and dynamic content projects, in the Beta or 
Production development stage, with less than 5 contributors. In addition, 78% of the bugs 
have a 5 (normal) level of priority, where priority ranges from 1 to 9, with 9 being the most 
important and highest priority.  
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Table 2. Percentage of bugs classified by the characteristics of the projects 
License Intended Audience Operating System Number of developers (N)
All highly 
restrictive 56% 
End 
Users/Desktop 44% POSIX 39% N=1 34%
All restrictive 79% Developers 53% MS Windows 38% 1<N≤5 37%
Some highly 
restrictive 60% 
System 
Administrators 22% Independent 29% 5<N≤10 13%
Some restrictive 80%     N>10 16%
Project Topic Project Status 
Communications 7% Education 2% Printing 1% 1 (Planning) 2% 
Security 3% Internet 8%   2 (Pre-Alpha) 4% 
Software 
Development 16% Site Management 6%   3 (Alpha) 16%
Desktop 3% Human Machine Interfaces 1%   4 (Beta) 33%
Text Editors 1% Office/Business 5%   5 (Production/Stable) 48%
Database 5% Dynamic Content 14%   6 (Mature) 3% 
Terminals 2% Games 3%   7 (Inactive) 3% 
 
633 bugs are still open at the time of the study.  Figure 1 shows the Kaplan-Meier 
estimate of the survivorship function. The initial steep decline shows that numerous bugs 
were solved shortly after the day they were posted on SourceForge. After that, the slow 
descent of the curve shows many bugs were not solved for long periods. Approximately 
50% of the bugs are estimated to be still unsolved at any time during the study. Also, the 
minimum value of the survivorship function is not zero, as the largest observed time was a 
censored observation. 
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Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier Estimate of the Survivorship Function 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimate
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4. Results 
Our sample contains 1711 bugs out of which 633 were still open at the time of our 
study. The presence of right censoring in our sample lends itself to the use of survival 
analysis that uses information from all the observations available, both censored and 
uncensored.   
Our independent variable of interest is the type of license under which the project 
operates. We define four dummy variables. ALL HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES is 
equal to 1 when all code falls under highly restrictive licenses and 0 otherwise. SOME 
HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES is equal to one when at least part of the code falls 
under highly restrictive licenses. ALL RESTRICTIVE LICENSES is equal to one when all 
code is govern by licenses that are at least restrictive, and SOME RESTRICTIVE 
LICENSES is equal to one when at least some of the code is govern by licenses that are at 
least restrictive.  
Figure 2 depicts the Kaplan-Meier estimator of the survivorship function for the 
group of bugs coming from projects with ALL HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES 
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compared to the rest of the bugs in the sample. The estimated survivorship function for 
bugs of projects with ALL HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES lies completely bellow 
that for the rest of the bugs. This means bugs of projects with ALL HIGHLY 
RESTRICTIVE LICENSES are solved quicker than the rest of the bugs in the dataset at 
any point during the study. In other words, at any point in time the proportion of bugs 
estimated to be fixed is greater for projects that operate under one or two highly restrictive 
licenses. The two curves do not cross at any point and show a similar pattern of survival. 
Therefore, to decide whether the difference observed in Figure 1 is significant, we conduct a 
log-rank test for equality of the survivor functions. The test value is 42.88; hence, we 
reject the null hypothesis that the two survivorship functions are the same (the statistic is 
significant at beyond the 1% level).  
 Figure 3 presents the estimated survivorship functions for the group of bugs of 
projects with ALL RESTRICTIVE LICENSES and the rest of the bugs in the dataset. In 
this case, the bug resolution experience for these two groups appears similar. A log-rank test 
supports this impression; it fails to reject the hypothesis of equality of the two estimates. In 
other words, there is no observed difference between the bug resolution rates of projects 
with one or two restrictive licenses and the rest of the projects. According to Figure 4, bugs 
coming from projects that operate under at least one highly restrictive license are solved 
faster than the rest of the bugs. This observation is confirmed by a highly significant log-
rank test. The situation is not as clear-cut in Figure 5, where projects are divided in those 
that are govern by at least one restrictive license and the rest of the projects. Also, tests for 
the equality of the survivor functions are not conclusive. The log-rank test and the Tarone-
Ware test reject the null of equality at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. On the other 
hand, the Wilcoxon and the Peto-Peto-Prentice tests fail to reject the null.  
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 These results suggest that bugs are solved at a faster rate when project leaders 
choose at least one highly restrictive license (that includes the viral provision) to govern 
their project. On the other hand, choosing at least one restrictive license (copy-left 
license) does not appear to affect the bug resolution rate. In other words, if the bug 
resolution rate is a proxy for project quality improvement, it appears that projects 
improve at a faster rate when contributors and users are not allowed to mix the source 
code with code that falls under different licenses (for example, proprietary licenses). The 
less restrictive copy-left requirement does not seem to have the same effect on quality 
improvement. 
Of course, it is necessary to control for other factors influencing the bug resolution 
rate. We now turn to the results of our estimation. We use a Cox proportional hazards 
model to estimate the effect of license type on bug fixing rates. Table 3 reports the hazard 
ratios estimates when we divide projects in two groups: those that operate only under highly 
restrictive licenses (ALL HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES) and the rest of the projects 
in our dataset. A hazard ratio greater than 1 in column (1) shows that, at any time during the 
study, bugs of projects operating under all highly restrictive licenses are fixed 56% faster 
than bugs of the rest of the projects. The hazard ratio estimate is significant at the 1% 
confidence level. Kuan (2002) finds that higher priority bugs are solved faster than lower 
priority bugs for FreeBSD (an open source Unix operating system). Moreover, we expect 
that bugs are solved sooner when there are many developers working on the project, 
interested in improving it to use it for their own use or to make their contributions more 
visible. We control for these confounding effects by including two independent variables in 
the specification: the bug priority level chosen by the individual who reported the bug and 
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Figure 5. Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates, 
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the number of developers working on the project. Contrary to our expectations, column (2) 
reports estimated hazard ratios close to 1 and insignificant. This indicates that the bug 
priority level and the number of developers working on the project do not affect the bug 
resolution time. The hazard ratio estimate on ALL HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES 
does not change.  
Table 3. Cox Proportional Hazards Model Results for All Highly Restrictive Licenses 
(Hazard Ratios reported) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All Highly Restrictive 
Licenses 
1.56 
(6.45) 
1.57 
(6.45) 
1.45 
(4.70) 
1.34 
(3.68) 
1.30 
(3.24) 
1.30 
(3.25) 
Bug Priority  1.00 (-0.04) 
1.01 
(0.19) 
1.02 
(0.59) 
1.01 
(0.20) 
1.01 
(0.34) 
Number of Developers  1.00 (0.62) 
1.00 
(0.49) 
1.01 
(2.18) 
1.01 
(2.08) 
1.01 
(1.28) 
Project Audience Dummy 
Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project Topic Dummy 
Variables No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Project Status Dummy 
Variables No No No No Yes Yes 
Project Operating System 
Dummy Variables No No No No No Yes 
Number of observations 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 
Z scores in parentheses 
The project audience dummies are: End-users, Developers, and System Administrators. The project topic dummies are: 
Communications, Security, Software Development, Desktop, Text Editors, Database, Terminals, Education, Internet, Site 
Management, Human Machine Interfaces, Office/Business, Dynamic Content, Game, and Printing. The project status 
dummies are: 1 (Planning), 2 (Pre-Alpha), 3 (Alpha), 4 (Beta), 5 (Production/Stable), and 6 (Mature). The project operating 
system dummies are: POSIX, MS Windows,  and Independent. 
 
We expect projects targeted towards developers or system administrators to attract 
contributors that are more skilled than those that work on applications for other audiences, 
like end-users. Contributors’ skill is likely to affect the bug resolution rates. Leaders of 
projects report on SourceForge.net the following four categories of intended audience: end-
users/desktop, developers, system administrators, and others. We construct three dummy 
variables that capture the type of audience targeted by the project: End-users, Developers, 
and System Administrators. We add these dummies and results are reported in column (3). 
The hazard ratio estimate for ALL HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES is slightly smaller. 
At any time during the study, when projects operate only under highly restrictive licenses, 
bugs are fixed 45% faster. The hazard ratio estimate on the Developers dummy is significant 
at the 5% level. Contrary to our expectations, it is less than 1, implying that bugs from 
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projects targeted towards software developers are solved at a slower pace than bugs from 
projects targeted towards other audiences. The estimate on the End-users and System 
administrators dummies are larger than 1, suggesting bugs of projects targeted towards these 
types of audiences are solved faster, but the estimates are not statistically significant. A 
possible explanation could be that projects targeted towards developers might have bugs that 
are more difficult. 
 We hypothesize that the difficulty of the bugs, that affects their resolution rates, is 
related to different characteristics of the software application. System complexity increases 
debugging time. In low-level applications (such as communication applications, like real time 
digital telephony), bugs tend to be very hard to spot. Also, in systems where performance is 
an issue (like databases), identifying the source of the bug takes time. In security applications, 
bugs are critical. If left unresolved, they may compromise the user’s entire operation. There 
are 16 types of project topics in our dataset: communications, security, software 
development, desktop, text editors, database, terminals, education, internet, site 
management, human machine interfaces, office/business, dynamic content, games, printing, 
and others. We construct dummies that capture every topic, except for the one denoting 
other topics. Column (4) specification includes these dummies. The hazard ratio estimate for 
ALL HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES decreases to 1.34 when we control for the 
project topic. It is still highly significant. When compared to bugs of projects with other 
topics, bugs of security and dynamic content projects are solved faster and bugs of software 
development, terminals, and site management projects are solved more slowly. The rest of 
the dummies hazard ratio estimates are insignificant.  
We also expect to find that the bug resolution rate is correlated to the project 
development stage. For example, when projects are in the planning stages, developers could 
be more interested in developing new features for the application than by fixing existing 
bugs. At the same time, in more mature projects, there could be less room for improvement 
in terms of new features; fixing bugs could become of primary interest. There are seven 
project development stages and we construct dummies to denote the first six. Column (5) 
reports the results of the model that includes these dummies. The hazard ratio estimate for 
ALL HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES is 1.30 and still significant at the 1% level. The 
four most advanced development stages have highly significant hazard ratio estimates (at the 
1% level).  
 17
 Column (6) includes dummies for another characteristic of the project, the operating 
system under which the application runs: POSIX, MS Windows, and an Independent 
operating system. We omit the dummy for other operating systems. The ALL HIGHLY 
RESTRICTIVE LICENSES hazard ratio estimate does not change. The POSIX and 
Independent operating system dummies have high hazard ratio estimates significant at less 
than the 1% level. 
After controlling for other observable confounding effects, for projects that operate 
under highly restrictive licenses, the bug resolution process seems to be significantly faster 
than for other projects. In other words, our results suggest that, when the license of the 
project requires that any subsequent contributions be made available under the original 
license, the quality of the application seems to improve at a faster rate.  
  We then classify the projects in the dataset in another two groups. We set to 
compare bug resolution rates for projects that are govern by at least one highly restrictive 
license (SOME HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES) with the rest of the projects. Table 4 
reports the results of our estimation.  
 
Table 4. Cox Proportional Hazards Model Results for Some Highly Restrictive Licenses 
(Hazard Ratios reported) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Some Highly Restrictive 
Licenses 
1.62 
(6.78) 
1.64 
(6.80) 
1.52 
(5.19) 
1.40 
(4.10) 
1.40 
(3.99) 
1.41 
(4.02) 
Bug Priority  1.00 (0.01) 
1.01 
(0.20) 
1.02 
(0.56) 
1.00 
(0.12) 
1.01 
(0.25) 
Number of Developers  1.00 (1.84) 
1.00 
(0.72) 
1.01 
(2.23) 
1.01 
(2.16) 
1.01 
(1.40) 
Project Audience Dummy 
Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project Topic Dummy 
Variables No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Project Status Dummy 
Variables No No No No Yes Yes 
Project Operating System 
Dummy Variables No No No No No Yes 
Number of observations 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 
Z scores in parentheses. 
The project audience dummies are: End-users, Developers, and System Administrators. The project topic dummies are: 
Communications, Security, Software Development, Desktop, Text Editors, Database, Terminals, Education, Internet, Site 
Management, Human Machine Interfaces, Office/Business, Dynamic Content, Game, and Printing. The project status 
dummies are: 1 (Planning), 2 (Pre-Alpha), 3 (Alpha), 4 (Beta), 5 (Production/Stable), and 6 (Mature). The project operating 
system dummies are: POSIX, MS Windows,  and Independent. 
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We add the same controls as above. We find that the hazard ratio estimate is greater than 1 
and highly significant. The results are again robust to the introduction of different controls. 
They suggest that bugs of projects operating under at least one highly restrictive license are 
fixed 40 to 64% faster than bugs of the rest of the projects at any time during the study. The 
coefficients on the priority level of the bug and the number of developers working on the 
project are again very close to 1 and insignificant. Together with our earlier results, our 
findings suggest that the viral provision of highly restrictive licenses seems to affect the 
speed of the bug resolution process. In other words, projects protected against the risk of 
“hijacking” by commercial vendors attract enough effort to have their bugs fixed more 
rapidly than the rest of the projects. 
 We next turn to explore the effect of the copy-left provision of less restrictive 
licenses. These require that the modified code be made freely available for the public. 
However, the contributor can decide on the type of OS license to govern the modified or 
extended piece of code. The results of estimation of specifications with the ALL 
RESTRICTIVE LICENSES dummy variable are reported in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Cox Proportional Hazards Model Results for All Restrictive Licenses 
(Hazard Ratios reported) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All Restrictive Licenses 1.06 (0.65) 
1.07 
(0.74) 
1.01 
(0.08) 
1.03 
(0.28) 
1.00 
(-0.03) 
1.03 
(0.35) 
Bug Priority  0.99 (-0.32) 
1.01 
(0.31) 
1.02 
(0.77) 
1.01 
(0.39) 
1.01 
(0.47) 
Number of Developers  1.00 (-0.65) 
1.00 
(-0.20) 
1.01 
(1.89) 
1.01 
(1.86) 
1.00 
(1.03) 
Project Audience Dummy 
Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project Topic Dummy 
Variables No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Project Status Dummy 
Variables No No No No Yes Yes 
Project Operating System 
Dummy Variables No No No No No Yes 
Number of observations 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 
Z scores in parentheses. 
The project audience dummies are: End-users, Developers, and System Administrators. The project topic dummies are: 
Communications, Security, Software Development, Desktop, Text Editors, Database, Terminals, Education, Internet, Site 
Management, Human Machine Interfaces, Office/Business, Dynamic Content, Game, and Printing. The project status 
dummies are: 1 (Planning), 2 (Pre-Alpha), 3 (Alpha), 4 (Beta), 5 (Production/Stable), and 6 (Mature). The project operating 
system dummies are: POSIX, MS Windows,  and Independent. 
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 We compare projects that operate under one or two restrictive or highly restrictive 
licenses and the rest of the projects. We cannot find a significant difference in the bug 
resolution speed between the two groups of projects. The estimates are close to 1 and 
insignificant.  
We repeat the analysis from Table 5 for the SOME RESTRICTIVE LICENSES 
dummy. The estimation results are presented in Table 6. When projects are governed by at 
least one restrictive or highly restrictive license, bugs are fixed around 20% faster. Estimates 
are significant at either the 5 or 10% level. 
  
Table 6. Cox Proportional Hazards Model Results for Some Restrictive Licenses 
(Hazard Ratios reported) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Some Restrictive Licenses 1.22 (2.16) 
1.23 
(2.26) 
1.18 
(1.72) 
1.21 
(1.98) 
1.17 
(1.68) 
1.20 
(1.85) 
Bug Priority  0.99 (-0.46) 
1.00 
(0.12) 
1.02 
(0.60) 
1.00 
(0.23) 
1.01 
(0.33) 
Number of Developers  1.00 (-0.77) 
1.00 
(-0.36) 
1.01 
(1.87) 
1.01 
(1.90) 
1.01 
(1.15) 
Project Audience Dummy 
Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project Topic Dummy 
Variables No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Project Status Dummy 
Variables No No No No Yes Yes 
Project Operating System 
Dummy Variables No No No No No Yes 
Number of observations 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 
Z scores in parentheses. 
The project audience dummies are: End-users, Developers, and System Administrators. The project topic dummies are: 
Communications, Security, Software Development, Desktop, Text Editors, Database, Terminals, Education, Internet, Site 
Management, Human Machine Interfaces, Office/Business, Dynamic Content, Game, and Printing. The project status 
dummies are: 1 (Planning), 2 (Pre-Alpha), 3 (Alpha), 4 (Beta), 5 (Production/Stable), and 6 (Mature). The project operating 
system dummies are: POSIX, MS Windows,  and Independent. 
 
To conclude, our results seem to support the hypothesis that the highly restrictive 
viral provision motivates individuals to contribute to projects and to respond faster to 
service requests. Nevertheless, our results are mixed when we analyze the less restrictive 
copy-left licenses. They are not consistent with the hypothesis that bug resolution rates are 
shorter when projects employ these licenses as opposed to unrestrictive licenses. Therefore, 
in the next section, we continue to explore the correlation between highly restrictive licenses 
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and the bug resolution speed and try to address the potential endogeneity problem stated 
earlier. 
 
5. Instrumental Variables Estimation Results 
 
 Although we found strong evidence that highly restrictive licenses are correlated with 
the rate of bug resolution, we are concerned that the license choice might be endogenous. It 
is quite possible that certain technical characteristics of the projects (apart from those 
included in the specification) indicate to project leaders that bugs are unusually hard or time-
consuming to solve. This knowledge might induce them to choose a particular type of OS 
license. We try to address this issue by using two different instruments: (i) the human 
language in which the contributors operate and (ii) the project leader’s previous project 
license type as instrumental variables.  
5.1. Human Language as Instrumental Variable 
 Lerner and Tirole (2005) find that projects in which contributors operate in Japanese 
are far less likely to have highly restrictive licenses than projects in English. On the other 
hand, projects in German and Spanish are much more likely to have highly restrictive 
licenses. Although the authors do not provide an explanation for the correlation between 
license type and language, we suspect that patent litigation and cultural differences are to 
blame. In European countries like Germany and France, the patent litigation decisions are 
reached reasonably quickly and the proceedings are not too expensive when compared to the 
U.S. This could explain the tendency of German and Spanish nationals to choose highly 
restrictive licenses, for example, licenses that do not allow the bundling of open source with 
proprietary code and protect the open code from potential infringement actions. On the 
other hand, in Japan, proceedings involve a series of meetings with the judges and the costs 
tend to be high. Thus, projects in Japanese are more likely to operate under less restrictive 
licenses (for example, licenses that allow contributors to use commercial code as part of 
modified versions). Moreover, cultural differences might provide a potential explanation for 
the correlation between language and license. For example, in Europe, where Roman law 
was adopted, law was regarded as the regulatory system for human relations and 
individuals could form secure relationships by entering a contract. On the other hand, in 
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Japanese history, the legal system did not play a role in human relationships; they were 
perceived as moral relationships. That could be the reason why the licenses adopted by 
projects in Japanese are less likely than projects in English to be highly restrictive.  
 Six languages in which open source contributors operate dominate our sample: 
English, French, German, Spanish, Russian, and Japanese. We construct dummies for all, 
except for English. Because our dependent variable, the license type, is a dummy, we 
employ a logit specification for the first stage of the instrumental variable estimation. We 
control for all observed characteristics of the project, as these might affect the license 
choice. Odds ratios are reported in Table 7.  
 
Table 7. First Stage Logit Estimates Using Natural Language as an Instrument for License 
Type 
(Odds ratios reported) 
 (1) Dependent Variable: All Highly Restrictive Licenses 
(2) Dependent Variable: Some 
Highly Restrictive Licenses 
Natural Language:   
- French 0.64 (-0.66) 
0.68 
(-0.55) 
- Spanish 7.68 (1.51) - 
- German 3.01 (1.93) 
2.85 
(1.75) 
- Russian 0.13 (-1.71) 
0.26 
(-0.98) 
- Japanese - - 
Number of Developers 0.95 (-1.85) 
0.94 
(-2.09) 
Project Audience Dummy 
Variables Yes Yes 
Project Topic Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Project Status Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Project Operating System Dummy 
Variables Yes Yes 
Number of observations 313 301 
Z scores in parentheses.  
The project audience dummies are: End-users, Developers, and System Administrators. The project topic dummies are: 
Communications, Security, Software Development, Desktop, Text Editors, Database, Terminals, Education, Internet, Site 
Management, Human Machine Interfaces, Office/Business, Dynamic Content, Game, and Printing. The project status 
dummies are: 1 (Planning), 2 (Pre-Alpha), 3 (Alpha), 4 (Beta), 5 (Production/Stable), and 6 (Mature). The project operating 
system dummies are: POSIX, MS Windows,  and Independent. 
 
We find that our language dummies are correlated with the ALL HIGHLY 
RESTRICTIVE LICENSES dummy [column (1)]. They are jointly significant at the 10% 
level. The results are consistent with Lerner and Tirole (2005), as projects in Spanish or 
 22
German are much more likely to operate only under highly restrictive licenses. Projects in 
French and Russian are less likely to be governed only by highly restrictive licenses. 
Nevertheless, only two of the dummies are statistically significant: the German dummy at 
the 5% level and the Russian dummy at the 10% level. The coefficient on the Japanese 
dummy is not estimated as all projects in Japanese in the sample operate only under 
highly restrictive license. When the dependent variable is SOME HIGHLY 
RESTRICTIVE LICENSES, our instrumental variables are jointly insignificant. The 
coefficients on the Spanish and Japanese dummies are not estimated as all projects in our 
sample that operate in these two languages are governed by at least one highly restrictive 
license.  
We also estimate a reduced form equation with the instruments and the exogenous 
variables as explanators for the bug resolution rate. All coefficients on human language 
are statistically insignificant, except for German, which is marginally significant at the 
10%. Its hazard ratio of 1.20 supports the identification story. Projects in German are 
much more likely to have highly restrictive licenses and bugs are solved faster when projects 
operate under highly restrictive licenses. 
A better alternative for using the human language in which the contributors 
operate as instruments would be to use the country where the developers are located. 
Unfortunately, we do not have projects’ country data available, as individuals are not 
required to share their locations on SourceForge.net. We argue that the human language 
is a good proxy for the location of the leaders of the project. When leaders choose only 
one language in which contributors operate, they do not expect the project to cross the 
country’s borders.  
 The other characteristic of a valid instrumental variable is the lack of correlation 
with the disturbance term. In other words, conditional on the controls included in the 
regression, the only effect of language on the bug resolution rate should be through the 
project’s license choice. We have no reasons to believe that Germans, for example, are 
more efficient at solving bugs than other nationals. In addition, we control for different 
characteristics of the projects that might affect the decision to choose a certain license 
type.  
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 Table 8 presents the results of our instrumental variable estimation. We report the 
hazard ratios. The specification in columns (1) and (2) compares projects with ALL 
HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES with the rest of the projects in the dataset.  
 
Table 8. Cox Proportional Hazards Estimation Using Natural Language as an Instrument for 
License Type 
(Hazard ratios reported) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
ALL HIGHLY 
RESTRICTIVE 
LICENSES 
0.53 
(-1.67) 
0.61 
(-4.46) - - 
SOME HIGHLY 
RESTRICTIVE 
LICENSES 
- - 0.35 (-2.18) 
0.68 
(-3.38) 
Bug Priority 1.02 (0.78) 
1.01 
(0.39) 
1.02 
(0.83) 
1.01 
(0.36) 
Number of 
Developers 
0.99 
(-0.11) 
1.00 
(-0.50) 
0.99 
(-0.80) 
1.00 
(-0.43) 
Project Audience 
Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project Topic 
Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project Status 
Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project Operating 
System Dummy 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 1498 1529 1426 1529 
Z scores in parentheses. 
The project audience dummies are: End-users, Developers, and System Administrators. The project topic dummies are: 
Communications, Security, Software Development, Desktop, Text Editors, Database, Terminals, Education, Internet, Site 
Management, Human Machine Interfaces, Office/Business, Dynamic Content, Game, and Printing. The project status 
dummies are: 1 (Planning), 2 (Pre-Alpha), 3 (Alpha), 4 (Beta), 5 (Production/Stable), and 6 (Mature). The project operating 
system dummies are: POSIX, MS Windows,  and Independent. 
 
In column (1) we use the predicted value of the ALL HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES 
variable from the logit model. The predicted values are therefore probability values 
(bounded between 0 and 1). The sign of the coefficient has changed and it is only marginally 
significant at the 10% level. In column (2), we construct a dummy variable for ALL 
HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES equal to 1 when the predicted value is higher or 
equal to 0.50, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient is still negative and, although our instrument 
is only weakly correlated with the endogenous variable, it is highly significant at the 1% level. 
In column (1), the hazard ratio decreases by 7% for every 10% increase in the probability of 
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ALL HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES. The hazard ratio in column (2) shows that, 
when projects operate only under highly restrictive licenses, bugs are fixed 39% slower than 
the rest of the bugs. The estimates of the coefficients on bug priority level and number of 
contributors do not change. They are close to 1 and insignificant, as they are without 
instrumenting. Columns (3) and (4) report the results of our instrumental variable estimation 
when projects with SOME HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES are analyzed. Hazard 
ratio estimates are less than 1 and significant at the 5% level (when predicted values are used) 
and 1% level (when we construct a new dummy using the same method we used for the 
ALL HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES dummy). Bugs of projects governed by at least 
one highly restrictive license are fixed at a slower rate than bugs of the rest of the projects. 
Column (3) shows that the hazard ratio decreases by 10% for every 10% increase in the 
probability of SOME HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES. According to column (4)’s 
estimate, bugs are fixed 32% slower for projects operating under at least one highly 
restrictive license. Thus, contrary to our hypothesis, controlling for the endogeneity of the 
license type, we find that projects that operate under highly restrictive licenses are actually 
slower at addressing bug requests than other projects.  
We are nevertheless concerned that the weak correlation between our instrument 
and the license choice could lead to bias in the instrumental variable estimator if the 
instrument is even moderately correlated with the disturbance. We try to address this issue 
by employing an alternative instrument strongly correlated with the endogenous variable, the 
project leader’s previous project license type.  
  
5.1. Project Leader’s Previous Project License Type as Instrumental Variable 
 
 We suspected a strong correlation between the types of license chosen for different 
projects by the same leader. It is quite probable to observe a strong correlation between a 
previous license choice and the current one. We hypothesize that a leader who chose a 
highly restrictive license in the past is more likely to choose the same type of license for the 
current project.  
We construct two dummy variables: one equal to 1 when a previous project operates 
under all highly restrictive licenses and another equal to 1 when it operates under at least one 
highly restrictive license. The sample is greatly reduced due to data availability. Table 9 
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presents the results of the first stage logit estimation. We report the odds ratios. Column (1) 
reports the results of the logit specification with ALL HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE 
LICENSES as the dependent variable. In column (2), SOME HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE 
LICENSES is the dependent variable. We control for the characteristics of the project in 
both specifications. Our results suggest that a project leader who chooses highly restrictive 
licenses for a project is indeed much more likely to release the code of the next project under 
the same type of licenses. The odds ratios are high and significant at the 1% level in both 
regressions. Consistent with our intuition, our alternative instrument has a very strong 
correlation with the endogenous variable.   
 
Table 9. First Stage Logit Estimates Using the Project Leader’s Previous Project License 
Type as an Instrument for License Type 
(Odds ratios reported) 
 (1) Dependent Variable: All Highly Restrictive Licenses 
(2) Dependent Variable: Some 
Highly Restrictive Licenses 
Previous Project – All Highly 
Restrictive Licenses 
8.65 
(3.45) - 
Previous Project – Some Highly 
Restrictive Licenses - 
10.25 
(3.44) 
Number of Developers 1.03 (0.55) 
1.03 
(0.50) 
Project Audience Dummy 
Variables Yes Yes 
Project Topic Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Project Status Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Project Operating System Dummy 
Variables Yes Yes 
Number of observations 119 119 
Z scores in parentheses. 
The project audience dummies are: End-users, Developers, and System Administrators. The project topic dummies are: 
Communications, Security, Software Development, Desktop, Text Editors, Database, Terminals, Education, Internet, Site 
Management, Human Machine Interfaces, Office/Business, Dynamic Content, Game, and Printing. The project status 
dummies are: 1 (Planning), 2 (Pre-Alpha), 3 (Alpha), 4 (Beta), 5 (Production/Stable), and 6 (Mature). The project operating 
system dummies are: POSIX, MS Windows,  and Independent. 
 
 Nevertheless, we are less confident than before about the validity of this second 
instrument. It is possible that a project leader initiates projects with similar unobserved 
characteristics that determine his license choices. In this case, the instrument would be 
correlated with the error term in the same direction as the endogenous regressor.  
Table 10 presents the results of instrumental variable estimation using the project 
leader’s previous project license choice as the instrument. We report the hazard ratios.  
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Table 10. Cox Proportional Hazards Estimation Using the Project Leader’s Previous Project 
License Type as an Instrument for License Type 
(Hazard ratios reported) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
ALL HIGHLY 
RESTRICTIVE 
LICENSES 
1.09 
(0.24) 
0.84 
(-0.91) - - 
SOME HIGHLY 
RESTRICTIVE 
LICENSES 
- - 1.07 (0.19) 
0.77 
(-1.48) 
Bug Priority 0.92 (-1.88) 
0.92 
(-1.94) 
0.92 
(-1.77) 
0.92 
(-1.81) 
Number of 
Developers 
1.00 
(-0.19) 
1.00 
(-0.30) 
1.00 
(-0.30) 
0.99 
(-0.60) 
Project Audience 
Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project Topic 
Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project Status 
Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Project Operating 
System Dummy 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 669 669 657 657 
Z scores in parentheses. 
The project audience dummies are: End-users, Developers, and System Administrators. The project topic dummies are: 
Communications, Security, Software Development, Desktop, Text Editors, Database, Terminals, Education, Internet, Site 
Management, Human Machine Interfaces, Office/Business, Dynamic Content, Game, and Printing. The project status 
dummies are: 1 (Planning), 2 (Pre-Alpha), 3 (Alpha), 4 (Beta), 5 (Production/Stable), and 6 (Mature). The project operating 
system dummies are: POSIX, MS Windows,  and Independent. 
 
Column (1) reports the results for the ALL HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES dummy. 
We use the predicted value of the first stage logit and control for the priority level of the bug 
and the characteristics of the project. The hazard ratios estimates are close to 1 and 
insignificant. The specifications in column (2) uses a license dummy equal to 1 when the 
predicted value is larger or equal to 0.50, and 0 otherwise. The hazard ratio estimate is less 
than 1, implying projects operating only under highly restrictive licenses are slower at fixing 
bugs. Nevertheless, the estimate is insignificant. Columns (3) and (4) present a similar story 
for the SOME HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSES dummy. Again, we use the predicted 
value from the first stage logit in column (3) and a dummy constructed in the same manner 
as before in column (4). Hazard ratio estimates are insignificant in both cases. Overall, the 
results suggest that, after controlling for endogeneity by using the leader’s previous license 
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choice as an instrument, there is no correlation between the license type and the bug 
resolution rate.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
While many studies explore the OS license choice at firm or project level, few papers 
analyze the way different license types affect the outcome of OS projects. This paper 
presents an empirical analysis of the relationship between the license choice and the quality 
of OS programs. We use SourceForge.net to collect data on more than 1700 bugs coming 
from about 300 projects. There are numerous dimension of quality of a software application. 
We employ the bug resolution rate as a proxy for project quality improvement. We classify 
the OS licenses in our dataset in three groups. Highly restrictive licenses require that any 
modified code be released under the same license as the original code. Restrictive licenses 
require that the altered code be made available for free use, modification, and redistribution, 
but not necessarily under the original license. Finally, unrestrictive licenses do not impose 
any such restriction on the modified code.  
The existing literature suggests different incentives for developers to contribute to 
OS projects: own use, talent signaling to peers and future employers, or simply enjoyment 
when solving a challenging programming task. Because of these various motivations, the 
chosen license might affect the appeal of OS projects on potential contributors in different 
ways. On the one hand, restrictive licenses that do not allow the bundling of the OS code 
with proprietary code might encourage developers to contribute. These licenses prevent 
commercial companies from “hijacking” OS code (mixing it with proprietary code and 
selling the final product). Hijacking might deprive initial contributors of some of the benefits 
they had expected from writing OS code. On the other hand, developers might actually be 
reluctant to join OS projects that operate under restrictive licenses when they believe the 
software could benefit from mixing its code with commercial code. In this case, unrestrictive 
licenses would be more appealing.  
In initial regressions, we find a strong positive correlation between highly restrictive 
licenses and the speed of bug resolution, that is robust to controlling for several 
characteristics of the projects. Nevertheless, we are concerned about the potential 
endogeneity of our license type variable. Unobserved technical characteristics of the projects 
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might indicate to project leaders that bugs are hard to solve, knowledge that might induce 
them to choose a particular OS license. We try to address this issue by using two different 
instruments: (i) the human language in which the contributors operate and (ii) the project 
leader’s previous project license type. Using human language, we find that restrictive licenses 
reduce the bug resolution rate. Nevertheless, this instrument is weakly correlated with our 
license type variable. Therefore, we use the previous license type chosen by the project 
leader as an alternative instrument. Although the second instrument is highly correlated with 
our license variable, we are less confident in his validity. This time, we find no effect of 
license type on the resolution rate. Taking these results as a whole, we conclude there is 
weak, but hardly convincing, evidence that restrictive licenses reduce bug resolution rates. 
 
Appendix 
Table 3. Cox Proportional Hazards Model Results for All Highly Restrictive Licenses 
(Hazard Ratios reported) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All Highly Restrictive 
Licenses 
1.56 
(6.45) 
1.57 
(6.45) 
1.45 
(4.70) 
1.34 
(3.68) 
1.30 
(3.24) 
1.30 
(3.25) 
Bug Priority  1.00 (-0.04) 
1.01 
(0.19) 
1.02 
(0.59) 
1.01 
(0.20) 
1.01 
(0.34) 
Number of Developers  1.00 (0.62) 
1.00 
(0.49) 
1.01 
(2.18) 
1.01 
(2.08) 
1.01 
(1.28) 
Project Audience:       
-End-users   1.07 (0.89) 
1.07 
(0.90) 
1.01 
(0.17) 
1.01 
(0.11) 
-Developers   0.86 (-1.93) 
1.04 
(0.50) 
0.93 
(-0.80) 
0.87 
(-1.67) 
-System Administrators   1.06 (0.71) 
0.90 
(-1.11) 
0.86 
(-1.58) 
0.95 
(-0.47) 
Project Topic:       
-Communications    0.90 (-0.70) 
0.83 
(-1.10) 
0.79 
(-1.46) 
-Security    2.26 (3.80) 
2.21 
(3.15) 
2.05 
(2.76) 
-Software Development    0.54 (-4.47) 
0.52 
(-4.57) 
0.60 
(-3.58) 
-Desktop    1.02 (0.12) 
1.22 
(0.96) 
1.24 
(0.98) 
-Text Editors    0.14 (-1.95) 
0.17 
(-1.78) 
0.16 
(-1.84) 
-Database    1.26 (1.48) 
1.20 
(1.14) 
1.28 
(1.55) 
-Terminals    0.39 (-2.43) 
0.40 
(-2.39) 
0.45 
(-2.05) 
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-Education    1.00 (0.00) 
0.96 
(-0.19) 
0.78 
(-1.05) 
-Internet    1.07 (0.50) 
1.03 
(0.22) 
1.04 
(0.27) 
-Site Management    0.59 (-2.88) 
0.61 
(-2.70) 
0.70 
(-1.95) 
-Human Machine Interfaces    0.67 (-1.01) 
0.63 
(-1.20) 
0.55 
(-1.51) 
-Office/Business    1.20 (1.22) 
1.19 
(1.11) 
1.15 
(0.88) 
-Dynamic Content    1.38 (2.77) 
1.31 
(2.31) 
0.99 
(-0.10) 
-Games    0.95 (-0.23) 
1.02 
(0.11) 
1.04 
(0.21) 
-Printing    1.20 (0.65) 
1.60 
(1.59) 
1.69 
(1.73) 
Project Status:       
-1 (Planning)     1.17 (0.59) 
1.30 
(0.98) 
-2 (Pre-Alpha)     0.89 (-0.61) 
0.90 
(-0.55) 
-3 (Alpha)     1.42 (2.91) 
1.34 
(2.39) 
-4 (Beta)     1.30 (2.78) 
1.28 
(2.45) 
-5 (Production/Stable)     1.62 (5.03) 
1.68 
(5.12) 
-6 (Mature)     1.90 (2.65) 
2.21 
(3.25) 
Project Operating System:       
-POSIX      1.52 (4.52) 
-MS Windows      1.10 (1.00) 
-Independent      2.14 (6.75) 
Number of observations 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 
Z scores in parentheses. 
 
Table 4. Cox Proportional Hazards Model Results Some Highly Restrictive Licenses 
(Hazard Ratios reported) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Some Highly Restrictive 
Licenses 
1.62 
(6.78) 
1.64 
(6.80) 
1.52 
(5.19) 
1.40 
(4.10) 
1.40 
(3.99) 
1.41 
(4.02) 
Bug Priority  1.00 (0.01) 
1.01 
(0.20) 
1.02 
(0.56) 
1.00 
(0.12) 
1.01 
(0.25) 
Number of Developers  1.00 (1.84) 
1.00 
(0.72) 
1.01 
(2.23) 
1.01 
(2.16) 
1.01 
(1.40) 
Project Audience:       
-End-users   1.05 (0.59) 
1.06 
(0.76) 
0.99 
(-0.10) 
0.99 
(-0.16) 
-Developers   0.85 1.03 0.93 0.86 
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(-2.13) (0.34) (-0.88) (-1.72) 
-System Administrators   1.03 (0.38) 
0.89 
(-1.31) 
0.85 
(-1.73) 
0.94 
(-0.59) 
Project Topic:       
-Communications    0.91 (-0.61) 
0.85 
(-1.01) 
0.80 
(-1.36) 
-Security    2.33 (3.95) 
2.39 
(3.42) 
2.18 
(2.98) 
-Software Development    0.56 (-4.12) 
0.54 
(-4.18) 
0.63 
(-3.18) 
-Desktop    1.03 (0.13) 
1.22 
(0.97) 
1.23 
(0.95) 
-Text Editors    0.14 (-1.97) 
0.16 
(-1.81) 
0.15 
(-1.87) 
-Database    1.25 (1.44) 
0.19 
(1.09) 
1.27 
(1.48) 
-Terminals    0.39 (-2.47) 
0.39 
(-2.42) 
0.44 
(-2.09) 
-Education    1.02 (0.09) 
0.97 
(-0.11) 
0.80 
(-0.96) 
-Internet    1.09 (0.63) 
1.04 
(0.29) 
1.04 
(0.29) 
-Site Management    0.57 (-3.10) 
0.59 
(-2.88) 
0.68 
(-2.11) 
-Human Machine Interfaces    0.70 (-0.97) 
0.64 
(-1.16) 
0.57 
(-1.44) 
-Office/Business    1.22 (1.34) 
1.20 
(1.19) 
1.16 
(0.99) 
-Dynamic Content    1.39 (2.85) 
1.32 
(2.42) 
1.00 
(-0.04) 
-Games    0.97 (-0.14) 
1.04 
(0.19) 
1.06 
(0.27) 
-Printing    1.22 (0.68) 
1.67 
(1.72) 
1.76 
(1.87) 
Project Status:       
-1 (Planning)     1.06 (0.22) 
1.18 
(0.62) 
-2 (Pre-Alpha)     0.86 (-0.82) 
0.87 
(-0.73) 
-3 (Alpha)     1.46 (3.14) 
1.39 
(2.66) 
-4 (Beta)     1.31 (2.84) 
1.29 
(2.57) 
-5 (Production/Stable)     1.64 (5.16) 
1.71 
(5.28) 
-6 (Mature)     1.86 (2.56) 
2.18 
(3.18) 
Project Operating System:       
-POSIX      1.51 (4.47) 
-MS Windows      1.08 (0.85) 
-Independent      2.13 (6.69) 
Number of observations 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 
Z scores in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Cox Proportional Hazards Model Results for All Restrictive Licenses 
(Hazard Ratios reported) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All Restrictive Licenses 1.06 (0.65) 
1.07 
(0.74) 
1.01 
(0.08) 
1.03 
(0.28) 
1.00 
(-0.03) 
1.03 
(0.35) 
Bug Priority  0.99 (-0.32) 
1.01 
(0.31) 
1.02 
(0.77) 
1.01 
(0.39) 
1.01 
(0.47) 
Number of Developers  1.00 (-0.65) 
1.00 
(-0.20) 
1.01 
(1.89) 
1.01 
(1.86) 
1.00 
(1.03) 
Project Audience:       
-End-users   1.17 (2.03) 
1.11 
(1.40) 
1.05 
(0.63) 
1.04 
(0.52) 
-Developers   0.80 (-3.04) 
1.00 
(-0.01) 
0.89 
(-1.31) 
0.82 
(-2.26) 
-System Administrators   1.15 (1.72) 
0.95 
(-0.53) 
0.89 
(-1.19) 
0.98 
(-0.16) 
Project Topic:       
-Communications    0.89 (-0.74) 
0.82 
(-1.19) 
0.77 
(-1.57) 
-Security    2.07 (3.43) 
1.98 
(2.73) 
1.88 
(2.43) 
-Software Development    0.49 (-5.35) 
0.47 
(-5.32) 
0.54 
(-4.29) 
-Desktop    1.09 (0.46) 
1.30 
(1.25) 
1.30 
(1.21) 
-Text Editors    0.16 (-1.82) 
0.19 
(-1.65) 
0.17 
(-1.73) 
-Database    1.22 (1.31) 
1.15 
(0.87) 
1.23 
(1.30) 
-Terminals    0.39 (-2.47) 
0.40 
(-2.39) 
0.44 
(-2.07) 
-Education    0.99 (-0.05) 
0.94 
(-0.25) 
0.77 
(-1.11) 
-Internet    1.09 (0.62) 
1.05 
(0.32) 
1.07 
(0.46) 
-Site Management    0.58 (-2.93) 
0.61 
(-2.67) 
0.70 
(-1.88) 
-Human Machine Interfaces    0.68 (-1.03) 
0.60 
(-1.31) 
0.53 
(-1.63) 
-Office/Business    1.18 (1.08) 
1.16 
(0.94) 
1.11 
(0.67) 
-Dynamic Content    1.38 (2.78) 
1.30 
(2.26) 
0.99 
(-0.08) 
-Games    0.95 (-0.26) 
1.03 
(0.12) 
1.03 
(0.13) 
-Printing    1.15 (0.50) 
1.53 
(1.44) 
1.61 
(1.59) 
Project Status:       
-1 (Planning)     1.18 (0.63) 
1.32 
(1.04) 
-2 (Pre-Alpha)     0.94 0.94 
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(-0.34) (-0.31) 
-3 (Alpha)     1.43 (2.99) 
1.33 
(2.33) 
-4 (Beta)     1.33 (3.00) 
1.29 
(2.54) 
-5 (Production/Stable)     1.64 (5.25) 
1.69 
(5.22) 
-6 (Mature)     2.11 (3.11) 
2.43 
(3.61) 
Project Operating System:       
-POSIX      1.54 (4.68) 
-MS Windows      1.10 (1.01) 
-Independent      2.14 (6.76) 
Number of observations 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 
Z scores in parentheses. 
 
Table 6. Cox Proportional Hazards Model Results for Some Restrictive Licenses 
(Hazard Ratios reported) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Some Restrictive Licenses 1.22 (2.16) 
1.23 
(2.26) 
1.18 
(1.72) 
1.21 
(1.98) 
1.17 
(1.68) 
1.20 
(1.85) 
Bug Priority  0.99 (-0.46) 
1.00 
(0.12) 
1.02 
(0.60) 
1.00 
(0.23) 
1.01 
(0.33) 
Number of Developers  1.00 (-0.77) 
1.00 
(-0.36) 
1.01 
(1.87) 
1.01 
(1.90) 
1.01 
(1.15) 
Project Audience:       
-End-users   1.13 (1.61) 
1.08 
(0.98) 
1.02 
(0.29) 
1.02 
(0.24) 
-Developers   0.79 (-3.23) 
0.99 
(-0.12) 
0.89 
(-1.36) 
0.83 
(-2.22) 
-System Administrators   1.14 (1.58) 
0.94 
(-0.64) 
0.88 
(-1.28) 
0.98 
(-0.19) 
Project Topic:       
-Communications    0.89 (-0.76) 
0.81 
(-1.27) 
0.76 
(-1.66) 
-Security    2.07 (3.42) 
1.94 
(2.68) 
1.84 
(2.36) 
-Software Development    0.48 (-5.84) 
0.46 
(-5.47) 
0.54 
(-4.37) 
-Desktop    1.08 (0.38) 
1.26 
(1.12) 
1.26 
(1.06) 
-Text Editors    0.16 (-1.84) 
0.18 
(-1.67) 
0.17 
(-1.76) 
-Database    1.23 (1.36) 
1.16 
(0.92) 
1.23 
(1.30) 
-Terminals    0.38 (-2.49) 
0.38 
(-2.39) 
0.44 
(-2.10) 
-Education    1.00 (-0.01) 
0.95 
(-0.21) 
0.78 
(-1.07) 
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-Internet    1.07 (0.51) 
1.03 
(0.22) 
1.05 
(0.34) 
-Site Management    0.60 (-2.75) 
0.63 
(-2.49) 
0.72 
(-1.73) 
-Human Machine Interfaces    0.70 (-0.95) 
0.61 
(-1.25) 
0.54 
(-1.53) 
-Office/Business    1.16 (1.00) 
1.13 
(0.80) 
1.09 
(0.56) 
-Dynamic Content    1.35 (2.59) 
1.27 
(2.07) 
0.97 
(-0.28) 
-Games    0.93 (-0.36) 
1.00 
(0.03) 
1.01 
(0.07) 
-Printing    1.15 (0.48) 
1.52 
(1.41) 
1.60 
(1.57) 
Project Status:       
-1 (Planning)     1.14 (0.49) 
1.27 
(0.91) 
-2 (Pre-Alpha)     0.93 (-0.38) 
0.94 
(-0.35) 
-3 (Alpha)     1.41 (2.89) 
1.33 
(2.31) 
-4 (Beta)     1.32 (2.90) 
1.28 
(2.49) 
-5 (Production/Stable)     1.62 (5.08) 
1.67 
(5.08) 
-6 (Mature)     2.17 (3.23) 
2.50 
(3.75) 
Project Operating System:       
-POSIX      1.52 (4.55) 
-MS Windows      1.08 (0.84) 
-Independent      2.13 (6.72) 
Number of observations 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 1529 
Z scores in parentheses. 
 
Table 7. First Stage Logit Estimates Using Natural Language as an Instrument for License 
Type 
(Odds ratios reported) 
 (1) Dependent Variable: All Highly Restrictive Licenses 
(2) Dependent Variable: Some 
Highly Restrictive Licenses 
Natural Language:   
- French 0.64 (-0.66) 
0.68 
(-0.55) 
- Spanish 7.68 (1.51) - 
- German 3.01 (1.93) 
2.85 
(1.75) 
- Russian 0.13 (-1.71) 
0.26 
(-0.98) 
- Japanese - - 
Number of Developers 0.95 0.94 
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(-1.85) (-2.09) 
Project Audience:   
-End-users 2.44 (2.90) 
2.77 
(3.21) 
-Developers 0.73 (-0.96) 
0.84 
(-0.51) 
-System Administrators 1.69 (1.25) 
1.81 
(1.35) 
Project Topic:   
-Communications 1.56 (0.64) 
1.25 
(0.33) 
-Security 0.95 (-0.04) 
0.56 
(-0.54) 
-Software Development 0.32 (-2.16) 
0.26 
(-2.54) 
-Desktop 2.30 (0.64) 
2.13 
(0.57) 
-Text Editors - - 
-Database 0.44 (-1.26) 
0.56 
(-0.92) 
-Terminals 0.06 (-1.64) 
0.06 
(-1.63) 
-Education 1.10 (0.11) 
0.88 
(-0.15) 
-Internet 1.81 (0.82) 
1.67 
(0.70) 
-Site Management 1.07 (0.08) 
1.53 
(0.45) 
-Human Machine Interfaces 0.53 (-0.48) 
0.39 
(-0.69) 
-Office/Business 2.33 (1.03) 
2.02 
(0.86) 
-Dynamic Content 1.70 (0.85) 
1.44 
(0.57) 
-Games 0.25 (-1.95) 
0.23 
(-2.06) 
-Printing 0.23 (-1.30) 
0.20 
(-1.43) 
Project Status:   
-1 (Planning) 0.19 (-1.56) 
1.03 
(0.03) 
-2 (Pre-Alpha) 6.06 (2.34) 
7.48 
(2.47) 
-3 (Alpha) 2.91 (2.06) 
2.47 
(1.71) 
-4 (Beta) 3.05 (2.66) 
2.81 
(2.44) 
-5 (Production/Stable) 2.11 (1.73) 
1.97 
(1.55) 
-6 (Mature) 7.41 (1.78) 
7.27 
(1.76) 
Project Operating System:   
-POSIX 1.57 (1.29) 
1.76 
(1.58) 
-MS Windows 0.91 (-0.28) 
1.02 
(0.05) 
-Independent 0.68 0.74 
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(-0.89) (-0.69) 
Number of observations 313 301 
Z scores in parentheses. 
 
Table 8. Cox Proportional Hazards Estimation Using Natural Language as an Instrument for 
License Type 
(Hazard ratios reported) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
ALL HIGHLY 
RESTRICTIVE 
LICENSES 
0.53 
(-1.67) 
0.61 
(-4.46) - - 
SOME HIGHLY 
RESTRICTIVE 
LICENSES 
- - 0.35 (-2.18) 
0.68 
(-3.38) 
Bug Priority 1.02 (0.78) 
1.01 
(0.39) 
1.02 
(0.83) 
1.01 
(0.36) 
Number of 
Developers 
0.99 
(-0.11) 
1.00 
(-0.50) 
0.99 
(-0.80) 
1.00 
(-0.43) 
Project Audience:     
-End-users 1.15 (1.35) 
1.23 
(2.38) 
1.26 
(1.88) 
1.18 
(1.92) 
-Developers 0.80 (-2.51) 
0.78 
(-2.94) 
0.79 
(-2.55) 
0.81 
(-2.43) 
-System 
Administrators 
1.09 
(0.80) 
1.06 
(0.58) 
1.19 
(1.56) 
1.04 
(0.38) 
Project Topic:     
-Communications 0.80 (-1.37) 
0.80 
(-1.33) 
0.78 
(-1.49) 
0.78 
(-1.52) 
-Security 1.84 (2.37) 
2.09 
(2.88) 
1.54 
(1.63) 
1.99 
(2.71) 
-Software 
Development 
0.46 
(-4.81) 
0.50 
(-5.04) 
0.40 
(-4.93) 
0.49 
(-5.01) 
-Desktop 1.43 (1.66) 
1.39 
(1.56) 
1.52 
(1.87) 
1.38 
(1.53) 
-Text Editors - 0.19 (-1.63) - 
0.19 
(-1.64) 
-Database 1.05 (0.28) 
1.11 
(0.63) 
1.03 
(0.19) 
0.10 
(0.61) 
-Terminals 0.38 (-2.39) 
0.37 
(-2.58) 
0.36 
(-2.48) 
0.39 
(-2.42) 
-Education 0.76 (-1.16) 
0.83 
(-0.82) 
0.74 
(-1.32) 
0.78 
(-1.07) 
-Internet 1.09 (0.60) 
1.12 
(0.77) 
1.10 
(0.60) 
1.10 
(0.63) 
-Site Management 0.68 (-2.01) 
0.75 
(-1.59) 
0.74 
(-1.49) 
0.78 
(-1.30) 
-Human Machine 
Interfaces 
0.48 
(-1.86) 
0.52 
(-1.63) 
0.44 
(-2.05) 
0.50 
(-1.73) 
-Office/Business 1.19 (1.07) 
1.24 
(1.38) 
1.28 
(1.55) 
1.15 
(0.88) 
-Dynamic Content 1.07 (0.51) 
1.10 
(0.78) 
1.13 
(0.93) 
1.01 
(0.11) 
-Games 0.89 0.86 0.79 0.91 
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(-0.49) (-0.68) (-0.92) (-0.46) 
-Printing 1.33 (0.88) 
1.36 
(1.03) 
1.13 
(0.38) 
1.43 
(1.19) 
Project Status:     
-1 (Planning) 1.09 (0.31) 
0.93 
(-0.27) 
1.93 
(2.18) 
1.29 
(0.97) 
-2 (Pre-Alpha) 1.06 (0.27) 
1.08 
(0.41) 
1.15 
(0.60) 
1.06 
(0.29) 
-3 (Alpha) 1.47 (2.95) 
1.50 
(3.24) 
1.35 
(2.13) 
1.42 
(2.81) 
-4 (Beta) 1.37 (2.83) 
1.46 
(3.75) 
1.38 
(2.62) 
1.37 
(3.18) 
-5 
(Production/Stable) 
1.73 
(5.28) 
1.79 
(5.86) 
1.67 
(4.30) 
1.75 
(5.63) 
-6 (Mature) 2.80 (3.92) 
2.73 
(4.14) 
3.09 
(3.82) 
2.62 
(3.99) 
Project Operating 
System:     
-POSIX 1.59 (4.68) 
1.65 
(5.43) 
1.66 
(4.45) 
1.66 
(5.39) 
-MS Windows 1.11 (1.08) 
1.07 
(0.72) 
1.20 
(1.83) 
1.08 
(0.83) 
-Independent 2.08 (6.45) 
2.06 
(6.55) 
2.11 
(6.48) 
2.08 
(6.60) 
Number of 
observations 1498 1529 1426 1529 
Z scores in parentheses. 
 
Table 9. First Stage Logit Estimates Using the Project Leader’s Previous Project License 
Type as an Instrument for License Type 
(Odds ratios reported) 
 (1) Dependent Variable: All Highly Restrictive Licenses 
(2) Dependent Variable: Some 
Highly Restrictive Licenses 
Previous Project – All Highly 
Restrictive Licenses 
8.65 
(3.45) - 
Previous Project – Some Highly 
Restrictive Licenses - 
10.25 
(3.44) 
Number of Developers 1.03 (0.55) 
1.03 
(0.50) 
Project Audience:   
-End-users 3.80 (1.90) 
4.97 
(2.27) 
-Developers 0.61 (-0.70) 
0.92 
(-0.11) 
-System Administrators 2.91 (1.43) 
3.68 
(1.72) 
Project Topic:   
-Communications 1.06 (0.05) 
0.55 
(-0.55) 
-Security - - 
-Software Development 0.10 (-1.88) 
0.04 
(-2.24) 
-Desktop - - 
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-Text Editors - - 
-Database 1.86 (0.51) 
4.20 
(1.13) 
-Terminals 0.30 (-0.29) 
1.06 
(0.01) 
-Education 0.41 (-0.52) 
0.20 
(-0.91) 
-Internet 2.92 (0.92) 
0.97 
(-0.03) 
-Site Management 0.09 (-1.16) 
0.06 
(-1.30) 
-Human Machine Interfaces - - 
-Office/Business - - 
-Dynamic Content 3.03 (0.73) 
2.63 
(0.64) 
-Games 0.40 (-0.76) 
0.44 
(-0.74) 
-Printing - - 
Project Status:   
-1 (Planning) - 1.34 (0.15) 
-2 (Pre-Alpha) 0.39 (-0.36) - 
-3 (Alpha) 7.90 (1.80) 
2.53 
(0.77) 
-4 (Beta) 5.44 (1.83) 
3.93 
(1.43) 
-5 (Production/Stable) 8.04 (2.21) 
7.93 
(2.13) 
-6 (Mature) - - 
Project Operating System:   
-POSIX 1.12 (0.18) 
1.48 
(0.58) 
-MS Windows 0.89 (-0.16) 
1.20 
(0.16) 
-Independent 0.53 (-0.73) 
0.71 
(-0.40) 
Number of observations 119 119 
Z scores in parentheses. 
 
Table 10. Cox Proportional Hazards Estimation Using the Project Leader’s Previous Project 
License Type as an Instrument for License Type 
(Hazard ratios reported) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
ALL HIGHLY 
RESTRICTIVE 
LICENSES 
1.09 
(0.24) 
0.84 
(-0.91) - - 
SOME HIGHLY 
RESTRICTIVE 
LICENSES 
- - 1.07 (0.19) 
0.77 
(-1.48) 
Bug Priority 0.92 (-1.88) 
0.92 
(-1.94) 
0.92 
(-1.77) 
0.92 
(-1.81) 
Number of 
Developers 
1.00 
(-0.19) 
1.00 
(-0.30) 
1.00 
(-0.30) 
0.99 
(-0.60) 
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Project Audience:     
-End-users 0.88 (-0.68) 
0.92 
(-0.45) 
0.90 
(-0.51) 
0.97 
(-0.16) 
-Developers 0.78 (-1.29) 
0.72 
(-1.68) 
0.77 
(-1.37) 
0.73 
(-1.73) 
-System 
Administrators 
0.58 
(-2.72) 
0.63 
(-2.45) 
0.60 
(-2.49) 
0.66 
(-2.22) 
Project Topic:     
-Communications 0.87 (-0.63) 
0.86 
(-0.71) 
0.86 
(-0.69) 
0.83 
(-0.87) 
-Security - - - - 
-Software 
Development 
0.46 
(-3.09) 
0.43 
(-3.53) 
0.49 
(-2.66) 
0.44 
(-3.35) 
-Desktop - - - - 
-Text Editors - - - - 
-Database 1.45 (1.15) 
1.42 
(1.08) 
1.44 
(1.13) 
1.48 
(1.20) 
-Terminals 0.53 (-1.39) 
0.52 
(-1.40) 
0.52 
(-1.44) 
0.52 
(-1.41) 
-Education 1.18 (0.47) 
1.07 
(0.19) 
1.21 
(0.51) 
1.03 
(0.09) 
-Internet 1.17 (0.77) 
1.20 
(0.91) 
1.21 
(0.94) 
1.27 
(1.18) 
-Site Management 0.31 (-2.19) 
0.30 
(-2.37) 
0.32 
(-2.13) 
0.28 
(-2.46) 
-Human Machine 
Interfaces - - - - 
-Office/Business - - - - 
-Dynamic Content 1.45 (1.30) 
1.49 
(1.42) 
1.46 
(1.31) 
1.48 
(1.40) 
-Games 0.53 (-1.62) 
0.47 
(-1.92) 
0.54 
(-1.56) 
0.46 
(-1.99) 
-Printing - - - - 
Project Status:     
-1 (Planning) - - 8.55 (4.49) 
8.72 
(4.54) 
-2 (Pre-Alpha) 1.63 (1.53) 
1.52 
(1.32) - - 
-3 (Alpha) 2.08 (3.34) 
2.24 
(3.71) 
2.37 
(3.14) 
2.58 
(3.50) 
-4 (Beta) 1.52 (2.33) 
1.62 
(2.72) 
1.63 
(2.32) 
1.83 
(2.95) 
-5 
(Production/Stable) 
1.87 
(3.61) 
1.99 
(4.00) 
2.03 
(3.31) 
2.27 
(3.95) 
-6 (Mature) - - - - 
Project Operating 
System:     
-POSIX 1.59 (3.17) 
1.62 
(3.33) 
1.54 
(2.90) 
1.55 
(2.96) 
-MS Windows 1.12 (0.69) 
1.13 
(0.75) 
1.10 
(0.60) 
1.12 
(0.70) 
-Independent 2.12 (3.91) 
2.11 
(3.87) 
2.09 
(3.85) 
2.04 
(3.71) 
Number of 
observations 669 669 657 657 
Z scores in parentheses. 
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